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OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE, AND SOME OF THE
RESULTING LEGAL RELATIONS
In the study and the practice of the law, our constant problem
is: what legal relations are the result of facts that occur; or,
starting from the other direction with a given set of legal rela-
tions (such as a contract, or a debt, or the ownership of land)
our problem is: what facts will operate to cause such a result?
One may take either starting point; and indeed for the best
results, it is necessary to take both, alternately working forward
and back, correcting and amplifying our necessarily tentative
conclusions. In the present article, the starting point will be
the contractual relations themselves, leading back to a consider-
ation of some of the facts and intermediate relations that
various forms?
The term contract has been used without much discrimination
to refer to three different things: (i) the series of operative
acts of the parties expressing their assent and resulting in new
legal relations; (2) the physical document executed by the
parties as an operative fact in itself and as the lasting evidence
of their having performed the necessary operative acts; (3) the
relations resulting from the operative acts, consisting of a right
or right in personain and the corresponding duties, accompanied
by certain powers, privileges and immunities.' Clearness of
I For a masterly analysis and classification of jural relations, see an
article on Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, in 23 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 16, by Professor W. N. Hohfeld
of the Yale School of Law.
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thought requires that whenever the term is used, one particular
meaning should be consciously adopted and clearly expressed.
Very likely it would be most convenient generally to define
contract in sense (3), as the legal relations between persons
arising from a voluntary expression of intention, and including
at least one primary right in personam, actual or potential, with
its corresponding duty. Unless otherwise indicated, the term
contract will be used herein with this meaning.
2
In determining whether or not a contract exists in any given
case, one of our problems is historical in character. What were
the facts? What were the acts of the parties and the circum-
stances that surrounded them? When these have been ascer-
tained the next step is analytical. Immaterial facts must be elim-
inated, and the rest must be classified as either evidential or
operative. The. operative facts are those that cause the existence
of those legal relations called a contract.
This analysis can only be made, and must be made, with
reference to the law of contract. This law is a part of the
general legal system under which we live, enforced by the societal
organization of which we are part. What the rules of this
society are, can be determined only by induction from the judg-
ments and decrees and pronouncements of the past. Under the
existing legal system no legal relation is deemed contractual in
the absence of certain voluntary acts on -the part of two con-
tracting parties. What acts are those which will cause society
to come forward with its strong arm? They may well be
described as operative or causative, for they are necessary
antecedents to the creation of those legal relations and societal
2 Compare the following definitions. "The most popular description of
a contract that can be given is also the most exact one; namely, that it
is a promise or set of promises which the law will enforce. The specific
mark of a contract is the creation of a right, not to a thing, but to
another man's conduct in the future." "Every agreement and promise
enforceable by law is a contract." Wald's Pollock, Contracts (3d ed.)
pp. 1, 2.
A contract is "an agreement enforcible at law, made between two or
more persons, by which rights are acquired by one or more to acts or
forbearances on the part of the other or others." Anson, Contracts (2d
Am. ed., Huffcut) p. ii.
"The act alone is the contract, the resulting contractual relation is
quite a different thing." Holland, Jurisprudence (ioth ed.) p. 251. See
also Bentham's classification, Works, III, i91.
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OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE
guaranty of compulsion called contract. The analysis of these
acts into offer and acceptance, customarily made by writers on
contract law, is a convenient one.
An offer is an act on the part of one person whereby he gives
to another the legal power of creating the obligation called
contract. An acceptance is the exercise of the power conferred
by the offer, by the performance of some other act or acts. Both
offer and acceptance must be acts expressing assent.
The act constituting an offer and the act constituting an
acceptance may each consist in a promise. A promise is an
expression of intention that the promisor will conduct himself
in a specified way in the future, with an invitation to the promisee
to rely thereon. If only one of the acts has this character, the
contract is unilateral. If both acts have this character, the
contract is bilateral. If neither of the acts has this character,
the new set of legal relations, if any exist, is not called obligation.
In such case there is no contract in sense (3) adopted above,
although there may be one in either of the other senses. Each
of these three cases will be discussed below. In none of these
cases will the expected legal relations be created unless the acts
of the parties comply with the rules relating to mutual assent,
consideration, form, capacity of parties, and legality of object.
Only certain rules relating to mutual assent will be considered
here.
BARTER
A mutual, present exchange of lands or chattels creates no
contractual duty. If A has apples to sell and B has money, A
may offer the apples to B for the money. -B may accept by
delivering to A the possession of the money. Such a transaction
is a barter. The character of the commodities exchanged is not
material. Such a transaction creates new physical relations, and
in an organized society it creates new legal relations. These new
relations arise by the voluntary action and consent of the two
parties, but there is no special right in personam. There is a
contract in sense (i) described above, and a documentary bill of
sale would be a contract in sense (2), but there is no contract
in sense (3). After such a transaction the apples "belong" to
B and the money to A; this means that organized society has
created numerous legal relations between each party and every
other member of society. A and B are said to have rights in rem,
a term that is useful even though likely to mislead some into
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YALE LAW JOURNAL
thinking that such a right is a physical relation to the res. The
legal relations created are not special relations between A and B;
they involve all persons alike, and exist in total independence of
their voluntary action or consent. If after the transaction A
should forcibly deprive B of the apples sold to him, he is com-
mitting no different wrong from that committed by X if he should
do the same, and he is subject to no different penalties. After
such a transaction the legal relations between A and B, arising
by their consent, are precisely like the legal relations existing
between X and B, although X has consented to nothing. Such a
transaction is often called an executed contract, but it is better
described as a barter or an exchange of goods.
GIFT
If A has lands or chattels and executes a gift to B, which
B accepts, there are acts of offer and acceptance and there is
mutual assent, yet no contractual obligation is created. As in the
case of a barter, the only rights involved are property rights or
rights in rem. The only duties created are those general duties,
binding upon non-participating persons as well as upon A. No
special right in personam is created. A's rights in rein and B's
former duties are extinguished, and in lieu thereof similar rights
are created in B and similar duties devolve upon A. The same
may be said of their respective privileges, powers, immunities,
and their correlatives. Thus, there are new legal relations,
arising from voluntary acts of offer and acceptance. and such acts
would fulfil the first definition of a contract given above. A
paper "deed of gift" would satisfy the second definition. The
resulting legal relations, however, should not be described as
contractual, according to definition (3). All other persons, and
not merely A and B, are parties to these new relations.
CONTRACT
If A has apples (or land) to sell, and B has no money, a
barter of apples for money is not possible; but A may be willing
to deliver his apples to B in return for B's promise to pay
money in- the future. If B agrees to this, receives the apples and
promises to pay the money, a new physical relation exists as to
the apples but not as to the money. As in the case of barter.
or gift, society creates numerous relations between B and all
other persons; as to the apples, he has rights in rem against such
other persons. B's rights are property rights and not contract
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OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE
rights. But the position of A is very different from that of
barter. A has no money, and no rights in ren, good as against
third persons who are not consenting; but a promise has been
made to A by B, the fulfilment of which is commanded by
organized society. If B fails to keep his promise, society will at
A's request exercise compulsion against B, but will exercise
compulsion against no other person. Special legal relations exist
between A and B, A having a claim against B -that he has
against no other person, and B having a duty that rests upon no
other person. These relations, with certain others that will not
here be discussed,3 constitute the obligation; and since they arise
from expressions of mutual consent, they are contract. A's
special right against B is called a right in personam.
UNILATERAL AND BILATERAL CONTRACTS
If the acts of A and B are such as to create a right or rights in
personam, actual or potential, in favor of A and against B, but
no such right in favor of B against A, the contract is called
unilateral. If they create mutual rights in personam with their
corresponding duties, the contract is bilateral. It has sometimes
been said that a contract must be binding on both parties or that it
is binding on neither, that mutuality of obligation is required; but
this is a loose and inaccurate statement. It has no application
whatever in the case of unilateral contracts. 4
(I) If A makes a promise in writing to pay B $Ioo and signs,
seals, and delivers the document, a unilateral obligation is created.
It creates a duty resting on A and a right possessed by B.
(2) If A accepts a bill of exchange drawn upon him by B in
3 They are, however, of vital importance, both practically and logically.
See Hohfeld, loc. cit. note I, supra.
4 Courts very frequently use the term "unilateral" to refer to a promise
that is without consideration, especially in those cases where mutual
promises have been given, but one of them is illusory: as where A
offers a promise to carry all the milk that B may care to ship, at fixed
rates, and B accepts the offer and promises to pay those rates for all
milk shipped by him with A. It is not unlikely that this is the prevailing
usage, but it is illogical and should be abandoned. Both A and B have
made promises, but neither promise has resulted in either a right or a
duty. There is no obligation, unilateral or otherwise. A has made an
offer and perhaps B still has a power of acceptance. This one new rela-
tion might be described as unilateral; but the same may be said of any
offer, and it is not customary to do so. See Morrow v. So. Express Co.
(1897) ioI Ga. 8io; Rehm-Zeiher Co. v. Walker (1913) I56 Ky. 6;
Anterican Refrig. Co. v. Chilton (19oo) 94 Ill. App. 6.
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favor of C, a right springs up in C and a duty rests on A. This
obligation between A and C is unilateral.
(3) If A gives to B his I 0 U in return for money loaned by
B, there is a similar unilateral contract.
(4) If B offers to A a conveyance of property in land or
chattels for a promise, and the offer is accepted, the contract is
unilateral. For example, B says to A, "This black horse is yours
as he stands in return for your promise to pay me $Ioo in
3o days." A replies, "I accept." This is an executed sale on
credit without warranty. B's offer confers upon A the power
to make the horse his own by making the requested promise.
No duty, special to himself, rests upon the offeror, and the offeree
gets no right in personam. The offeror gains a right in personam
and the offeree gets instantly certain right in rem.
(5) A offers a promise of a reward of $ioo to anyone who
will arrest X. B, with knowledge of this offer and with intent
to accept it, arrests X. A unilateral obligation at once arises. 6
(6) A writes to B, "Ship me 2 cars XX flour via B. & 0.,
at once, price $io per bbl. COD." B ships at once as.
requested.1
((7) A sends his brother to B with the following letter of
credit, "Let Harry have $ioo and I will guarantee repayment
in 30 days." B advances $ioo as requested.8
(8) A promises B to pay him a salary at the rate of $Io,ooo
a year for B's services as superintendent. B may recover at the
specified rate for such service as he thereafter renders, but the
hiring is a hiring at will.'
5 Mactier v. Frith (183o) 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 103. Langdell, Sunmary, sec.
14, suggests that in this case no promise was necessary, because a debt
would arise on Mactier's acceptance of the brandy; but the writer believes
that such an acceptance necessarily involves a promise to pay, in fact,
and that without such a promise the offeror did not intend title to pass.
0 See Williams v. West Chi. St. Ry. (19Ol) 191 Ill. 61o; Williams v.
Carwardine (1833) 4 B. & Ad. 621; Biggers v. Owen (1887) 79 Ga. 658;
Shucy v. U. S. (875) 92 U. S. 73.
7 See Wood v. Benson (1831) 2 Cr. & J. 44; Challenge Wind Mill Co.
v. Kerr (1892) 93 Mich. 328; Wheat v. Cross (1869) 31 Md. 99.
8 Lascelles v. Clark (igio) 2o4 Mass. 362; Lennox v. Murphy (1898)
171 Mass. 370; Eddowes v. Niell (1793) 4 Dall. (U. S.) 133; Bishop v.
Eaton (1894) 161 Mass. 496; Offord v. Davies (1862) 12 C. B. (N. S.)
748.
9 Martin v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. (1895) 148 N. Y. 117; Harper v. Hassard
(1873) 113 Mass. 187; Stensgaard v. Smith (i8go) 43 Minn. ii; Orr v.
Ward (1874) 73 Ill. 318.
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OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE
It has been said that unilateral contracts are made either by
an offer of a promise for an act or by an offer of an act for
a promise.10 This means, although the descriptive words are not
exact, that the single duty may rest on the offeror, the right
being in the offeree, or vice versa. The words are inexact,
because the making of a promise is itself an act. All offers are
acts and all acceptances are acts, whether the resulting legal
relations are property as in the case of a barter, or constitute a
contractual obligation, either unilateral or bilateral. In example
(i) above, the offeror makes a promise and undertakes a duty,
but he requests no act whatever as an equivalent. The only
act on the part of the offeree is such an act of acceptance of the
physical document as may be necessary to constitute a legally
effective delivery by the offeror. The duty is on the offeror.
In example (2), C makes the offer when he presents the bill
to A for acceptance. He thereby confers upon A the legal
power of 'binding himself alone to pay a sum of money. In
presenting the bill C does an act, but he is not offering this act
as the legal equivalent and agreed return for A's promise. There
is no offer of an act for a promise, but the act of the offeror
was necessary before the offeree could undertake the duty.
Example (3) is a case where it does hot clearly appear which
one made the offer. If A offered his I 0 U to be accepted by a
transfer of money, it was an offer of a promise for an act. If
B offered a transfer of the money in return for the I 0 U, the
case is just like example (4), except that there is paper evidence
of A's promise.
Example (4) is a case where the duty is assumed by the
offeree. B's act has been unhappily described as an offer of an
act for a promise. B does indeed do an act when he makes the
offer just as any offeror must necessarily do; but he does not
offer the act, he does the act. This act is completely performed
even before A hears of it and perhaps long before A makes his
promise. This act, regarded as in itself the consideration for
A's promise, would be past consideration. The effect of B's act
in making the offer is to confer upon A a power to create new
legal relations. It produces this effect instantly and in so doing
is wholly exhausted. The exercise of this power requires no
further act upon B's part; it requires merely acceptance by
A. The legal effect of this acceptance is the instant extinction
10 Anson, Contracts (2d ed., Huffcut) sec. 22.
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of B's rights in rem and other property relations in respect of
the horse and the creation in A of similar rights and relations.
The consideration for A's promise is this substitution of rights,
and it is this substitution that is offered in return for the one
right in personam to be created by A's promise.
Examples (5), (6) and (7) are all cases where a promise is
offered for an act. That is, A by promissory words gives to B
the power of creating in himself a right in personam as against
A by doing an act or acts which A desires to be done. In (5)
this act is one affecting the physical and legal relations of X, a
third party. In (6) B's act effects a substitution of property, A
becoming owner of the flour. It also effects a physical change
in the location of the goods. In (7) B's act confers property
upon Harry, and extinguishes such property in B. It gives B in
return a right in personam against A, enforcible after 30 days.
A bilateral contract is made in exactly the same way as is a
unilateral contract or a barter. The offeror does an act con-
ferring a power upon the offeree, and the offeree does the. act
that constitutes the exercise of the power. The legal result,
however, is a relation consisting of mutual rights and duties,
special and personal in character. The following are examples of
bilateral contracts:
(9) A says to B, "I promise to serve you as bookkeeper for
one month in return for your promise to pay me $ioo." B
replies, "I accept."
(IO) A writes to B, "I promise to convey Blackacre to you
on June Ist in return for your promise to pay me $I,ooo at that
time. You may accept by cable, using the one word 'Blackacre'."
B sends the cable despatch "Blackacre," as requested.
In case (9) the acts of offer and acceptance are oral promissory
words. In case (io) the offer is the act of writing and the
further acts whereby this writing is brought to the offeree. The
acceptance consists of acts by B, whereby he directs the cable
company to transmit the word "Blackacre." These acts by B
would not customarily amount to a promise to pay $i,ooo, but
in this case they do become such a promise because A will so
interpret them and B knows it. In the same way any other act,
in itself meaningless, may be specified and may thereby become a
return promise.
It is not always an easy matter to determine whether a contract
is in fact unilateral or bilateral. Frequently, this determination
will have very important results, especially where the offeror has
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OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE
attempted to revoke his offer as explained elsewhere. The form
of words used by the parties is not at all conclusive, when
examined out of their setting and with the aid of nothing but a
dictionary. The meaning of words, as used by the parties to a
contract, cannot be determined with mathematical certainty; and
the judge who is most certain to do injustice is the pedant who
holds contractors to meticulous accuracy in the usage of words
and in the construction of sentences."
It can hardly be said that courts are often pedantic in this
matter, though it is possible that professors of law may be. The
distinction between unilateral and bilateral is not even yet very
thoroughly grasped by the multitude of lawyers, a fact which
leads -them to repeat again and again the erroneous statement
that one cannot be bound unless the other is bound. The judges,
therefore, are not in general too likely to hold that a proposed
contract is unilateral when the parties meant it to be bilateral.
1 2
11 ""The logic of the portion of the opinion . . . .above quoted,
from the standpoint of the grammarian and verbal precision, is unassail-
able; but it may be questioned whether so literal, narrow, and technical
a construction ought to be put upon such an ordinary business communi-
cation." Bauman v. McManus (1907) 75 Kan. io6. "In interpreting a
declaration of intention, the real intention is to be looked for and it is
not to be tied to the literal sense of the expression." German Civil Code,
sec. 133.
12 "Whenever circumstances arise in the ordinary business of life in
which if two persons were ordinarily honest and careful the one of them
would make a promise to the other, it may properly be inferred that both
of them understood that such a promise was given and accepted." Ex
parte Ford (885) 16 Q. B. D. 305, 307. In Mapes v. Sidney (x623) Cro.
Jac. 683, the defendant promised to pay the debt of J. S. to the plaintiff
in consideration that the plaintiff would forbear to sue J. S. Plaintiff
alleged that he forbore per magnum tempus. Winch and Hutton, J.J.,
thought this bilateral, the plaintiff having promised to forbear forever.
Hobart, C.J., thought it unilateral, but that the plaintiff had forborne
sufficiently for acceptance; he said, "without express words he is not
chargeable by promise." Similar contracts were held to be bilateral in
Therne v. Fuller (1616) Cro. Jac. 396; Cowlin v. Cook (about 1626)
Latch, 151. That Mr. Justice Holmes is not unwilling to discover the
implication of a promise on evidence that seems not any too strong, see
Wheeler v. Klaholt (igoi) 178 Mass. 141; Martin v. Meles (igoi) 179
Mass. 114.
Where a promise is given by the offeror, with a proviso or condition
attached, the fulfilment of which requires action by the offeree, not only
is it frequently inferred that such action is the intended consideration for
the promise but it is also inferred that the offeree has promised that the
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Suppose A writes to B, "I will pay you $5,ooo for Blackacre,"
and B replies, "I accept your offer." This seems to be bilateral,
and it is too late for A to revoke. A clearly makes a promise to
pay money; and, according to the ordinary understanding of
mankind, he requests B to make a return promise to convey the
land. But if A has asked an actual conveyance of Blackacre as
the equivalent of his promise, there is no contract at all, and A
may revoke.
In example (8) above, some courts have found in the words
of the parties a promise by A to pay to B a year's salary and a
return promise by B to serve for a year. In such case the hiring
is not at will, but for a year; and this despite the fact that there
are no express promissory words of that sort.13
In example (6) above, it has often been held that the offeree
may accept by mailing a letter containing a promise to supply
the goods-an "acceptance of the order," and that a revocation
after such acceptance is too late, even though the goods are not
yet shipped.' 4 It must not be assumed too readily that an order
for goods is an offer of a promise in return for title to the
goods to be effected by the act of shipment or otherwise. The
offeror frequently wishes a return promise, as the offeree under-
stands. The language used may be elliptical, and understood
to be so.
EXPRESS, IMPLIED, AND TACIT CONTRACTS
A brief definition of these terms will suffice here. An express
contract is said -to exist when the acts of the parties declaring
their will and intention are spoken or written words. A tacit
contract is any other kind, the acts of the parties being sufficient
action shall take place. Dunton v. Dunton (1892) 18 Vict. L. R. 114;
Jamieson v. Renwick (1891) 17 Vict. L. R. 124; Lewis v. Atlas Mut. Life
Ins. Co. (1876) 61 Mo. 534; cf. Binnington v. Wallis (1821) 4 B. &
Ald. 65o.
On the other hand, where the defendant had made a written promise
to remain with the plaintiff for two years for the purpose of learning to
be a dressmaker, the court refused to draw the inference of a promise
by the defendant to serve or of a promise by the plaintiff to employ.
Lees v. Whitcomb (1828) 5 Bing. 34, 2 M. & P. 86.
13 Beach v. Mullin (1870) 34 N. J. L. 343, 345; Grossman v. Schenker
(1912) 2o6 N. Y. 466. See Mechem, Agency (2d ed.) sec. 6o3.
24American Pub. Co. v. Walker (igol) 87 Mo. App. 503; Gordon Malt-
ing Co. v. Bartels Brewing Co. (1912) 26 N. Y. 541; Sanford v. Brown
Bros. Co. (1913) 2o8 NM. Y. go; Bauman v. McManus (19o7) 75 Kan. io6.
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O'FFER AND ACCEPTANCE
to express their intention but not consisting of words, either
spoken or written. It can easily be seen that a tacit contract is
also, in a broader sense, an express one. Words are often lame
and halting things in performing their function of expressing
thought. It is often true in fact that actions speak louder than
words. The term implied contract is generally used to mean
exactly the same as tacit contract. The intention of the parties
is "implied" or inferred from their actions other than words.
For some centuries, however, it has been customary to describe
as a "contract implied in law" certain other legal relations, in
cases where neither the words of the parties nor their other acts
justify an inference that they intended to create such relations.
This usage seems to have been due to two reasons: in the earlier
cases the courts desired to make the form of action called
assumpsit available for the enforcement of certain duties not
intentionally assumed; and in some of the later cases the courts
desired to avoid the appearance of creating legal rights and
duties where the parties had not so agreed. Thus the term implied
contract became a slippery one upon which judicial reasoning has
not infrequently slipped into error. The legal relations commonly
described as contracts implied in law are now coming to be called
quasi contracts. It is not necessary here to describe what these
are; it is enough to observe that they are not contracts in fact,
either express or tacit.
VOID, VOIDABLE, AND UNENFORCIBLE CONTRACTS
The term void contract is an apparent self-contradiction. This
depends, however, upon the sense in which we are using the term
contract. In this case it appears to be used to refer to the acts of
offer and acceptance by the parties or to the document evidencing
such acts.
In the case of a void contract, the parties perform acts that
would usually operate to create new contractual relations, but
fiave no such operation in the particular case. Rights and other
relations will exist after such a transaction, but they will not be
contract rights and relations. A contract right is a primary
right in personam arising from expressions of consent. In the
case of a void contract, there are expressions of agreement, but
they do not have the usual legal effect. If these acts are mere
words, they are not operative facts at all. Standing alone, they
have no legal effect. They may, however, be accompanied by
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other acts, e. g., a delivery of goods, that have legal operation.
The legal relations consequent upon these accompanying acts
are never the ones that the parties had in contemplation. The
offer creates no legal power in the offeree; and if his act of
acceptance creates new legal relations, that is due to legal powers
that he possessed even before the offer was made.
In the case of a voidable contract, the acts of the parties, even
when they are mere words, operate to create new legal relations,
and these are in a measure the ones contemplated by the parties.
They are usually described as rights and duties, privileges and
powers, etc., just as in the case of a valid contract ;15 but one of
the parties has the additional power and privilege of extinguish-
ing them. The exercise of this power is described as the disaf-
firmance or avoidance of the contract. Another way of describ-
ing a voidable contract is to say that the contemplated contractual
relations do not yet exist, but that one of the parties has an
irrevocable power to create them. His subsequent act is then
called ratification.
The term unenforcible contract includes both void contracts
and voidable contracts. It is customarily used so as to describe
certain other legal relations also. When a contract has become
unenforcible by virtue of the statute of limitations, the obligor or
debtor has a power to create a new right in the other party
as against himself (and to destroy his own existing privilege) by
a mere expression of his will, without any act of assent by the
other and without a new consideration. He cannot, however, as
in a voidable contract, destroy the existing rights of the other
party or create new rights in himself as against that other.
When a contract is unenforcible by reason of the statute of
frauds, either party has the legal power to create rights as
against himself (or to terminate his existing power of destroying
the other's rights) by signing a written memorandum, but
he has no such power to create rights in his own favor.
In these cases a legal relation exists that is different from
that existing in the case of a void contract or of a voidable one.
15 "It was resolved that in all cases when the deed is voidable, and so
remains at the time of the pleading (as if an infant seals and delivers a
deed, or a man of full age by duress) in these and the like cases, the
obligor cannot plead non est factum, for it is his deed at the time of the
action brought." Whelpdale's Case (I6o5) 5 Coke, ihg a; Wald's Pol-
lock, Contracts (3d ed.) p. 7; Windscheid, Pandekten, I, secs. 7o, 82.
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It appears that this difference is not as one author says, "mainly
a difference between substance and procedure."' 1  The difference
between a power to create a right against another person and a
power to create a right against only oneself is not merely
procedural.
Both voidable and unenforcible contracts are like valid con-
tracts in this: there have been acts expressing agreement, and
they are legally operative facts creating new legal relations. The
resulting legal relations are different from those existing in the
case of a valid contract; but these relations are distinct in
character, are of considerable practical importance, and deserve
even better names than they have received.
There are next to be considered the acts of offer and accept-
ance by means of which the foregoing legal relations are finally
established, and also some of the intermediate relations that arise
prior to the closing of the contract.
THE OFFER
Definition. An offer is defined above as an act whereby one
person confers upon another the power to create contractual
relations between them. It has not been customary to describe
as a "power" the new legal relation consequent upon an offer;"
but this term seems to be the most accurate description of that
relation. It is similar to the relation existing in the case of
agency."" The principal, by an act called "appointment,"
creates in the agent the power of creating (in conjunction with
a third person) new legal relations between the principal and
a third person. After the one voluntary act of the principal
called "appointment," nothing further remains to be done by
him; thereafter it is the voluntary act of the agent that is opera-
tive to create new relations. So in the case of an offer: the act
of the offeror operates to create in the offeree a power, and
having so operated it is exhausted; thereafter the voluntary act of
18 Anson, Contracts (2d Am. ed., Huffcut) sec. i9.
17 The first, and the best, presentation of this concept that has been seen
by the writer is in the article on Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions
as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, in 23 YALE LAW JouRNAL, i6, 49, by
Professor W. N. Hohfeld, to whom the writer acknowledges great in-
debtedness. In Jordan v. Dobbins (1877) 122 Mass. I68, the court speaks
of a continuing guaranty as "a power or authority which he might at any
time revoke."
18 See Hohfeld, loc. cit. p. 46.
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the offeree alone will operate to create the new relations called
a contract.
The Operative Act. What kind of act creates a power of
acceptance and is therefore an offer? It must be an expression of
will or intention. It must be an act that leads the offeree reasona-
bly to believe that a power to create a contract is conferred upon
him. This applies to the content of the power as well as to the
fact of its existence. It is on this ground that we must exclude
invitations to deal or acts of mere preliminary negotiation, and
acts evidently done in jest or without intent to create legal rela-
tions. All these are acts that do not lead others reasonably to
believe that they are empowered "to close the contract." So
long as it is reasonably apparent that some further act of the
offeror is necessary, the offeree has no power to create
contractual relations by an act of his own and there is as yet no
offer.
Communication. No act can induce another to believe that he
is empowered to accept unless he is aware that the act has been
performed. So it would seem to be essential that an offer shall
be communicated to the offeree, and it has generally been held
that acceptance is impossible prior to such communication. Thus,
where a reward was offered by publication, for service desired,
it has been held that the rendition of the service in ignorance
of the offer creates no contract. 9 The contrary has been held
in some cases.2 0  Some judges have thought that where two
offers, identical in terms, cross each other in the mail, there is no
contract.2 ' In these two instances there is no contract if the
only way to create a contract is by the machineiy of offer and
acceptance, regarded as acts expressing consent. In the reward
cases, the offeror has acted and has consented; the offeree has
acted but his act was not an expression of consent. In the case
of crossed offers, each party has acted and has expressed consent;
19 Fitch v. Snedaker (1868) 38 N. Y. 248; Vitty v. Eley (igoo) 5I App.
Div. (N. Y.) 44; Williams v. West. Chi. St. Ry. (igoi) I9I Ill. 6io.
20 Gibbons v. Proctor (1891) 64 L. T. (N. S.) 594; disapproved by
Pollock, Contracts (3d ed.) p. 21; also by Anson, Contracts (2d. Am.
ed., Huffcut) p. 25; also by Ashley, Contracts, p. iS. Smith v. State
(1915) x5i Pac. (Nev.) 512; Dawkins v. Sappington (1866) 26 Ind. 199;
Stone v. Dysert (1878) 20 Kan. 123; Cummings v. Gann (1866) 52 Pa.
St. 484; Neville v. Kelly (1862) 12 C. B. (N. S.) 740.
2t Tinn v. Hoffman (1873) 29 L. T. (N. S.) 27i; two judges contra.
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but in so doing, neither has knowingly exercised a power con-
ferred by the other and neither has been induced to believe
that he has such a power to exercise. Each has done an act
conferring a power upon the other, and either one may now
exercise that power by a subsequent act and thus create a con-
tract. There is, however, no inevitable necessity in our adop-
tion of the machinery of offer and acceptance. The rules of
contract, like all other rules of law, are based upon mere
matters of policy, or belief as to policy. In the process of our
evolution we find that some or all of us are following a customary
rule. When we become conscious of this fact, we try to express
the rule in words and to compel others to obey it by legislative
command. We may fail in our attempt, either because the
custom supposed is not the custom of the powerful, or because
we have failed to express it with accuracy, or because new life
conditions require new customs. So, therefore, we may decree
that two acts expressing consent, as in the case of crossed offers,
shall create contractual relations; or that where an offer has
been published, that act empowers others to create contractual
relations by doing the acts requested, even though without
knowledge of the request. It seems not improbable to the
writer that this latter rule will prevail in the future.22  In the
vast majority of cases, however, contracts will be made by offer
and acceptance as analyzed above.
Time Limit. An offer having been made and a power having
been thereby created, how long will this power continue to exist?
The offeror is the creator of the power, and before it leaves his
hands he may fashion it to his will. Such is the present decree
of society. If he names a specific period for its existence, the
offeree can accept only during this period. If the offeror names
no period whatever, the power will be held to exist for a reasona-
ble time, to be determined as a fact by the court and dependent
upon the circumstances.2 3  If the parties are negotiating in each
other's presence, the reasonable time will usually be a very short
one; but if the offeror indicates that the power of acceptance
is to be exercised in absentia, the reasonable time will be
22 This is the rule in fact adopted by the German Civil Code, sec. 657.
Ashley, Contracts, p. 13, says: "An offer uncommunicated is inconceivable."
For cases where it was in fact conceived, see note 2o, supra.
23 Loring v. Boston (844) 7 Met. (Mass.) 409; Averill v. Hedge (1838)
12 Conn. 424.
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considerably longer.24  If the time taken by the offeree would
appear to be reasonable to a reasonably prudent man in his
position, the acceptance is operative even though the offeror did
not intend the power to exist for so long a period. A reasonable
time may be longer than the offeror in fact intended. On the
other hand, there seems to be no good reason for holding that
the power of acceptance has expired if it can be shown as a
fact that the offeror intended that it should still exist. A
reasonable time may be longer than the offeror intended, but it
can never be less.
25
Revocation. In most cases the offeror may terminate the
power of acceptance prior to the end of the specified period, if
any, or of the reasonable time. In the first place he may have
expressly provided that the power should be subject to revoca-
tion, either by notice to the offeree or without such notice. If he
provides for a revocation without notice and bT a mere change
of his mental state, he can scarcely be said to have conferred
any power at all. The power conferred by such an offer is a very
flimsy one indeed, for the validity of the acceptance will depend
upon the offeror's own will when he is notified of the acceptance.
Such an offer is little more, in effect, than an invitation for bids.
If the reserved power of revocation is to be exercised by an overt
act, then there is a substantial power of acceptance, the validity
of the act of acceptance being then not dependent upon the will of
the offeror.
Even though the power to revoke has not been expressly
reserved by the offeror, it can be said that as a general rule he
retains such a power. In such a case, however, the power to
revoke can be exercised only in a particular manner. If the
offer was made by publication, it has been held that it can
be revoked either by actual notice to a claimant or by a notice
published in the same manner as was the offer.20  If the offer
24 The German Civil Code, sec. 147, lays down substantially the same rule.
25 All that would seem to be necessary is overt action by the offeror
sufficiently indicating, his intention that the power shall continue. This
principle is involved in the facts of A1actier v. Frith (183o) 6 Wend.(N. Y.) lo3; Tinn v. Hoffman (1873) 29 L. T. (N. S.) 271. See criticisms
of Mactier v. Frith, in Langdell, Summary of Cont., sec. 14, and Ashley,
Contracts, p. 48.2
0SZuey v. U. S. (1875) 92 U. S. 73; Pollock says of this case: "it
seems a rather strong piece of judicial legislation." Wald's Pollock,
Contracts (3d ed.) p. 23. To the writer it seems no stronger than are
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provides for a revocation without notice and by a r cha
of his mental state, he can scarcely be sai t co f
any power at all. The power conferred by such a offer i r
flimsy one indeed, for the validity of the acceptance ill depend
upon the offeror's own will when he is notified f t e t .
Such an offer is little more, in effect, than an invitation f r i .
If the reserved power of revocation is to be exercised by a ert
act, then there is a substantial power of acceptance, t e li it
of the act of acceptance being then not dependent upon the ill f
the offeror.
Even though the power to revoke has not been expressly
reserved by the offeror, it can be said that as a general rule he
retains such a power. In such a case, however, the power to
revoke can be exercised only in a particular manner. If the
offer was made by publication, it has been held that it can
be revoked either by actual notice to a claimant or by a notice
published in the same manner as was the offer.26 If the ffer
24 The German Civil Code, sec. 147, lays down substantially the same rule.
25 All that would seem to be necessary is overt action by the offeror
sufficiently indicating, his intention that the power shall continue. is
principle is involved in the facts of Mactier 'iI. Frith (1830) 6 \Ve d.
(N. Y.) 103; Tim~ 'iI. Hoffman (1873) 29 L. T. (N. S.) 271. See criticis s
of .Mactier 'iI. Frith, in Langdell, Summary of COli f., sec. 14, a d s l ,
Contracts, p. 48.
26 Shuey 'iI. U. S. (1875) 92 U. S. 73; Pollock says of this case: "it
seems a rather strong piece of judicial legislation." l 's ollock,
Contracts (3d ed.) p. 23. To the writer it see s no stronger t an re
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was made by personal communication to one or more particular
persons, it can be revoked only by giving notice to them, such
notice being effective only when received."7
Irrevocable Offers. It has been asserted that no offer can be
irrevocable, 28 various reasons being advanced for such a con-
clusion. It may be that by the prevailing rule of the common
law offers are always revocable; it may even be true that
considerations of policy and convenience require that all offers
shall be revocable; but it is here insisted that the question of their
revocability is not to be determined by rules of pure logic or of
mathematics, that there is no inevitable necessity or universal
law foreclosing discussion. The principle here to be adopted
the decisions on any other rule of the law. See also Sears v. Eastern R.
Co. (1867) 14 Allen (Mass.) 433. The same rule is adopted by the Ger-
man Civil Code, sec. 658, and by the Jap. Civil Code, art. 530.
27 Byrne v. Van Tienhoven (i88o) 5 C. P. D. 344; Stevenson v. McLean
(188o) 5 Q. B. D. 346. See also Dickinson v. Dodds (1876) 2 Ch. D. 463;
Frank v. Stratford (19o4) 13 Wyo. 37.
In the early case of Hurford v. Pile (1615) Cro. Jac. 483, an offer
seems to have been held to be irrevocable. The entire report is as follows:
Assumpsit. Whereas J. S. being in execution for forty pounds, the
defendant said, "Deliver J. S. out of execution, and what it cost you I
will repay;" wherefore J. S. was discharged by the plaintiff. The defend-
ant for plea saith, that after the assumpsit, and before the plaintiff had
done any thing in that business, he forbade him to meddle therein, and
that he would not stand to his promise. The plaintiff demurred; and it
was adjudged for the plaintiff.
Houghton, Justice, said, that a man may discharge an assumpsit made
to himself, but he cannot discharge an assumpsit made by himself: but,
at another day, the defendant's counsel moved, that it was a good plea,
and that as long as nothing was done, it was but an executory promise.
Doderidge. If I promise to J. S. that if he build an house upon my
land before Michaelmas, I will pay him a hundred pounds, and I counter-
mand it before he hath done any thing'concerning the house, it is a good
countermand.
Houghton contra; but he said, that may be considered in damages
adjournatur.
Afterwards, in Trinity term, judgment was given for the plaintiff.
See also Howe v. Beeche (1685) 3 Lev. 244.
28 "It is indispensable to the making of a contract that the wills of the
contracting parties do, in legal contemplation, concur at the moment of
making it. An offer, therefore, which the party making it has no power
to revoke, is a legal impossibility." Langdell. Summary of the Law of
Contracts, sec. 178, also sec. 4. See also, Wormser, The True Conception
of Unilateral Contracts, 26 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 137, note; Lee, Contract,
Jenks, Digest of Eng. Civ. Law, sec. i9"; Ashley, Contracts, sec. 13.
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is of the same character as any other legal principle, and is to be
determined by established custom, by positive legislation, and by
considerations of policy and convenience.2 9  In various systems
of law in other countries, and sometimes by statute in this
country, offers are expressly declared to be irrevocable under
certain circumstances. 0  These statutes, however, might be
construed as depriving the offeror of his privilege of revoking
without depriving him of his power to revoke. It is not believed
that they would be so construed. The view that an offer cannot
be irrevocable seems based upon a failure to bear in mind the
essential character of the relation as a power conferred upon the
offeree. If an offer were a physical emanation, a sort of radio-
activity of a human body, no doubt a stop might always be put
to it. If an offer were a state of mind, no doubt society could
not ordain its continuance against the offeror's will.8 1 An offer,
however, is an act creating the legal relation called a power to
accept. The act cannot be revoked at all, for it is of yesterday.
The resulting power is from society and can be maintained by
society indefinitely.
8 2
29 Langdell seemed to regard considerations of this sort as "irrelevant!'
See Summary of the Law of Contracts, sec. 15.
80 Swiss Code of Obligations, sec. 3: "One who makes an offer to
another, and prescribes a definite time for acceptance, is bound by his
offer until the expiration of the time fixed."
German Civil Code, sec. 145: "One who has conferred upon another
the power to close a contract is bound by his offer unless he has provided
to the contrary." (But the Code provides that if no time is specified, the
acceptance must take place within a brief period according to circum-
stances. See secs. 147-150.) Sec. 658: "An offer of a reward is revocable
prior to the beginning of performance."
Japanese Civil Code, art. 521: "An offer of a contract made with a
fixed period of time specified for acceptance cannot be withdrawn." Art.
524: "An offer made to a person at a distance without fixing a period of
time for acceptance thereof, cannot be withdrawn for such a period of
time as is reasonably necessary for the offeror to receive notice of the
acceptance."
By sec. 3645, Civil Code of Georgia, it is provided that a "party may
withdraw his bid or proposition, unless a given time is agreed on in
which the other party may assent." See Black v. Maddox (1898) 1o4
Ga. 157, I6I.
81 This was perhaps Langdell's view, although he often uses expressions
inconsistent with it; and it is maintained in Ashley, Contracts, sec. 13.
82 In Adams v. Lindsell (i818) 1 B. & Aid. 681, it was said: "The
defendants must be considered in law as making, during every instant of
the time their letter was travelling, the same identical offer to the plain-
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Physical Limitation. Irrevocability may have any one of several
meanings: first, that the offeror has no legal power to revoke by
any means, lawful or unlawful; second, that he is not legally
privileged to revoke, although he may have the legal power; third,
that although he has both the legal power and the privilege of
revoking by certain means, these means are not within his present
physical capacity. Under our law nearly all offers are for a time
irrevocable in the third sense. Revocation can take place only
after a certain fashion, commonly by giving actual notice to
the offeree. So long as it is impossible to reach the offeree
with such a notice or to do such other act as may amount to a
revocation, the power of acceptance will continue to exist.83
This means that although the offeror is privileged to revoke and
has the legal power to revoke by doing certain acts, the perform-
ance of these acts is beyond his limited human capacity.
Contractual Limitation. An offeree's power is irrevocable in
the second sense, either by the giving of notice or otherwise, if the
offer is put in the form of a conditional covenant or simple
contract, 4 or if the offer is accompanied by a promise not to
tiffs." See also Boston and Maine R. Co. v. Bartlett (1849) 3 Cush.
(Mass.) 224; Nyulasy v. Rowan (i8gi) 17 Vict. L. P. 663. If an offer
were at every instant revocable, these decisions would be wrong, and
Cooke v. Oxley (1790) 3 T. R. 653 would not have been overthrown.
33 See Ashley, Contracts, p. 34.
34 O'Brien v. Boland (1896) I66 Mass. 481; Watkins v. Robertson (i9o6)
105 Va. 269; Danbinann v. Rittler (i889) 70 Md. 380; McMillan v.
Ames (1885) 33 Minn. 257. Some cases refuse specific performance, if
revocation preceded acceptance, but expressly on the ground of lack of
consideration, and they indicate that the offer is irrevocable if a con-
sideration is paid. Corbett v. Cronkhite (9o9) 239 Ill. 9; Crandall v.Willig (1897) i66 Il. 233; Graybill v. Brugh (1893) 89 Va. 895; Bishop
Contracts, sec. 325. In i Ames, Cases on Equity, p. 2oo, is the following
note: "if after giving an option to buy certain property the giver makes
a will devising the specific property, the courts, to effectuate the supposed
intention of the testator, give to the devisee the land, if the option is not
exercised, and the proceeds, if the holder ol the option elects to buy.
Drant v. Vause (1842) 1 Y. & Coll. 58o; Emuss v. Smith (1848) 2 De G.
& Sm. 722; In re Isaacs [x894] 3 Ch. 5o6, 51o; In re Pyle [1895] I Ch.
724." The devise is an apparent act of revocation, but a subsequent
acceptance is effective, and the acceptor is entitled to specific performance.
Butler and Baker's Case (159I) 3 Coke, 25 a, 26 b, presents a good
illustration of an irrevocable power: "If A makes an obligation to B
and delivers it to C to the use of B, this is the deed of A presently; but
if C offers it to B, there B may refuse it in pais, and thereby the obliga-
tion will lose its force." This is a covenant, delivered in escrow, con-
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revoke given for a consideration or under seal. In such case the
offeror is never privileged to revoke, and he may not even have
the legal power. It may be said that these are contracts and
are not mere offers; but the fact remains that in all such cases the
act of the offeror has conferred upon the offeree a power to
create future relations, a power that is in all respects similar to
the power conferred by any offer, a power to 'be exercised by the
voluntary act of the offeree alone. The offeree is not bound to
do the act that constitutes the condition or acceptance; but if he
does do that act, new contractual relations are created. When the
courts enforce the duties included among these relations, they do
so expressly on the theory that there was an offer that could
not be revoked.35
ditional only upon B's assent. A has no power of revocation, as is
universally held. It is due to the fact that B's power is irrevocable that
the courts have called the existing relations a contract, a tendency notice-
able in other cases. See notes 41 to 47, below. Some will maintain that
in this case B has a right; but if so, he also has the power to destroy
it by a mere expression of dissent, and this cannot be said of contract
rights in general.
3 In O'Brien v. Boland, supra, the court said: "In the present case,
because the offer was under seal, it was an irrevocable covenant, condi-
tional upon acceptance within ten days, and the written acceptance within
that time made it a mutual contract which the plaintiff can enforce." In
Guyer v. Warren (1898) 175 IIl. 328, it is said: "The covenant in the
present contract, giving an option to purchase, was in the nature of a
continuing offer to sell." In Willard v. Tayloe (1869) 8 Wall (U. S.)
557, Justice Field said: "The covenant in the lease giving the right or
option to purchase the premises was in the nature of a continuing offer
to sell. It was a proposition . . . . from which the defendant was not
at liberty to recede."
On the other hand, in Mansfield v. Hodgdon (1888) 147 Mass. 304, Mr.
Justice Holmes said: "The defendant's undertaking not having been a
mere offer, but a conditional covenant to sell, bound him irrevocably to
sell in case the plaintiff should elect to buy."
In Galton v. Emuss (1844) I Coll. 243, one Nash contracted with
Galton that he should "have the offer, for twelve months, of both the
estates . . . . by the trustees under the will of the said John Nash."
Later Nash devised the estates to the trustees, defendants, for other uses
and with no power to convey to the plaintiff. The trustees refused to
offer the estates to the plaintiff on the agreed terms, but the plaintiff
gave them notice of this intention to purchase. Vice Chancellor Knight
Bruce decreed specific performance.
In Jordan v. Dobbins (1877) 122 Mass. 168, a conditional covenant was
held to be revocable.
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If there is in fact a promise to keep the offer open for a
specified time, the question of revocation should turn upon the
matter of consideration and upon the question of damages. If
there is an agreed equivalent given for the promise, a repudiation
will beyond doubt create a right to damages. The same result
would be reached where the offeree has done detrimental acts in
reasonable reliance upon the promsie in those courts adopting
the (so-called) estoppel theory of consideration. 36  Further, in
this case the offer should be held to be irrevocable and the
repudiation of the promise to be wholly without the effect
intended, if a subsequent acceptance does not unreasonably
increase the damages to be suffered by reason of the breach. In
this case, the offer would be irrevocable in the first (and the
best) sense. After a contract has been made, a repudiation by
one of the parties creates in the other only a right to such
damages as he will suffer after taking all reasonable steps for
the prevention of damage. If further performance by him will
increase his loss, the other party is under no duty to pay the
damages caused by such further performance.37 But if such
action will not increase his loss, he may proceed with his
performance without affecting his claim to damages. In
the cases now being considered, whether they be regarded as
contracts to hold an offer open or as conditional covenants, the
power conferred should be regarded as irrevocable if the execu-
tion of the power does not increase the damage to be suffered
in case of breach. Such damages are not increased in any
respect if the act of acceptance or the fulfilment of the condi-
tion consists merely in the giving of a notice or the making of a
promise. In spite of an attempted revocation, the offeree still
has the power of acceptance; while the offeror lacks not only
the privilege of revoking, but also the power to revoke. Thus,
suppose that A should offer to convey Blackacre in return for B's
promise to pay a price named, and should promise for a consid-
eration or under seal not to withdraw the offer for 3o days. In
such a case, acceptance (the act of exercising the power) would
be merely the making of a promise to pay the price. This would
86 See Clarno v. Grayson (18g6) 30 Or. ini. The Illinois Court refused
to hold that such a reliance made the offer irrevocable. Corbett v. Cronk-
hite (19o9) 239 Ill. 9.
37 Clark V. Marsiglia (1845) i Den. (N. Y.) 317; American Pub. Co.
v. Walker (igoi) 87 Mo. App. 503.
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not in any respect increase the damage suffered by reason of a
breach. B's damages, whether for breach of the preliminary
option contract, or for breach of the subsequently created contract
to convey, would be the value of Blackacre, less the contract price.
In cases where B's damage is regarded as irreparable, he should
be given a decree for specific performance in equity. The same
conclusion follows if the transaction be regarded as a covenant
to convey Blackacre on condition that a promise by B to pay the
price shall be made within 30 days.
38
Suppose, however, that A offers to pay $5,000 to B in return
for the destruction by B of a valuable building that obstructs
A's view, giving B a 3o-day option as before. If in this case
A gives notice of repudiation, B's power of acceptance (or
of creating new contractual relations by fulfilment of the con-
dition) is destroyed. The act of acceptance is here a very
expensive one and would greatly increase the loss. B cannot
maintain an action of debt for $5,ooo, for the destruction of the
building was the quid pro quo and its fulfilment would now be
unjustifiable. B's remedy is in assumpsit for damages, being
$5,ooo, less the value of the building saved. Even in a case of
this sort, if A has promised to convey Blackacre, instead of to
pay money, and the breach of his promise is regarded as about
to cause B irreparable injury, equity would no doubt approve
the destruction of the building and would decree specific per-
formance of A's promise. In such a case, A's offer is clearly
irrevocable, in the true meaning of that term.
Specific Performance. An obstacle to specific performance in
equity may be supposed to exist in case the option (let us
suppose an option to buy) is a contract to hold an offer open
instead of a conditional covenant or simple contract. In the
latter case there is a completed obligation to convey, and this
may be enforced. In the former case there is no such obligation,
and none can be made because the option contract has been
broken and the offer has been revoked. This obstacle can be
avoided by the simple expedient of not seeing it. The asserted
impossibility of doing an act has many a time been disproved
by doing it. If by definition the thing is impossible, change the
definition. The objection can be met verbally in two ways:
first, by the easy method of declaring the offer irrevocable and the
38 BIack v. Maddox (I898) 1o4 Ga. 157; and cases in note 34, supra.
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option contract unbreakable.3 9 That this can be done has already
been shown above. There is nothing foreign to our law in the
idea of an irrevocable power, and the legal relation resulting
from an offer is a legal power. The power to accept being still
alive, the offeree may exercise it and thus create the obligation to
convey, all fit and ready for specific enforcement. The second
form of meeting the objection may be preferred *by some, but it is
the same in essence. Everybody agrees that the option contract
creates an obligation that is enforcible. It may be described as a
contract to make a contract. Even if the second contract-the
obligation to convey-is never formed, equity still has jurisdiction
on the ground that money damages are inadequate. Nor is it
without the power to enforce a decree. Even if we suppose that
equity cannot specifically enforce the contract to make a contract,
it can do exactly what it does in all of its decrees for specific
performance: it can decree specific reparation. In this case a
conveyance of the property would be such reparation, for it was
the ultimate object of the option contract. Nobody doubts the
power of equity to force a conveyance of the res and to compel
the creation of new rights in rem, even though many have sup-
posed that this can be done only by acting in personam.4 0  Indeed,
it seems strange that these same individuals should doubt the
power of equity to compel the creation of a new obligation in
personam, through the medium of an irrevocable power.
Limitations Due to Part Performance. There are still other
cases where it has sometimes been held that an offer is irrevocable,
even though there is no express promise to hold the offer open.
These are offers made in such terms that they can be accepted
only by performing a series of acts requiring an appreciable
length of time and effort or expense. Upon complete perform-
ance of these acts, the power of acceptance becomes irrevocable
because it has been fully executed and a contract has resulted;
but in a few cases it has been held, contrary to what is generally
supposed to be the rule, that the offer becomes irrevocable after
the offeree has begun to perform the requested acts of acceptance
39 Langdell said that a contract incapable of being broken "is also a legal
impossibility;" Summary of Cont., sec. 178. He rested his statement,
however, upon the premise that no offer could be irrevocable.
40 For an elucidation of this point see the excellent article on The Powers
of Courts of Equity, in 15 COL. L. REv. 37, io6, 228, by Professor Walter
Wheeler Cook of the Yale School of Law.
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or has performed a substantial part of such acts." It must
be observed that after such a part performance there is as yet
no contract, for by hypothesis acceptance was to consist of
complete performance. If the offer has become irrevocable,
however, the offeree still has the power to create a contract by
completing the requested acts, in spite of a notice to the contrary
from the offeror. The principle applied in these cases is applica-
ble not merely to offers of unilateral contracts, but also to offers
where the offeree is requested to make a return promise and to
express it by one or more acts requiring a considerable expendi-
ture of time or money. The cases in point, however, are mostly
cases of offers to make a unilateral contract.
In one case, the defendant offered a reward for the arrest and
conviction of some criminals. The plaintiff arrested them and
induced their confession, but they were not convicted because the
defendant wished to use their testimony in other cases and so
had the indictments dismissed. It was held that the plaintiff was
entitled to the reward.
42
Again, a defendant delivered a negotiable note in escrow for
the plaintiff, to be paid when the plaintiff had completed a line
of railway. After part performance by the plaintiff the de-
fendant gave notice of revocation. The courtheld this notice to
be ineffective, saying: "it would be manifestly unjust thereafter
to permit the offer that had been made to be withdrawn. The
promised consideration had been partly performed, and the
contract had taken on a bilateral character." 43
41Hoze v. Beeche (1685) 3 Lev. 244; Daminbmann v. Rittler (1889) 70
Md. 380, may be such a case, although the court treats the case as if there
were a conditional contract to deliver at the buyer's option. The court
states a promise by defendant to deliver from 300 to 500 tons of phosphate,
the plaintiffs to give 24 hours' notice of their wants. No promise by the
plaintiff, or other consideration, is stated. After 300 tons had been deliv-
ered, the defendants repudiated further obligation; but the court held
the defendants bound to fill later orders. See following notes.
42 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Goodnight (1874) IO Bush (Ky.) 552.
Similar cases are: Stone v. Dysert (1878) 2o Kan. 123; Stephens v.
Brooks (1867) 2 Bush (Ky.) 137; Mosley v. Stone (igoo) io8 Ky. 492;
Williams v. U. S. (1876) 12 Ct. Cl. 192. Contra, Biggers v. Owen (1887)
79 Ga. 658.
43Los Angeles Traction Co. v. Wilshire (i9o2) 135 Cal. 654; if the note
can be regarded as a specialty, the decision is supported by the principle
of Butler and Baker's Case, supra, note 34; cf. Gray v. Hinton (i88i) 7
Fed. 8r.
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OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE
In another case, a corporation passed a by-law providing that
employees should be entitled to a share in the profits after
serving for a named period. The plaintiff was discharged
one day before he would have been entitled to share under this
by-law. His action for such share was sustained, the court
saying: "It is true as a general proposition that a party making
an offer of a reward may withdraw it before it is accepted. But
persons offering rewards must be held to the exercise of good
faith and cannot arbitrarily withdraw their offers for the purpose
of defeating payment."
44
A defendant offered to buy all railroad ties "you put on at Gap
within the next twelve months." The plaintiff had supplied
I,ooo ties and had secured material for 5,000 more, when the
defendant gave notice of revocation. The court held the plaintiff
to be entitled to damages for failure to take the remaining 5,000
ties.45
If an owner has offered a commission to a real estate broker,
to be earned by effecting a sale, can the offer be revoked after
the broker has spent time and money and may have a sale nearly
consummated? In such a case the courts are very ready to
make the assumption that there was a bilateral contract, for
breach of which the broker is entitled to damages, or that the
services of the broker were completed, the acceptance valid, and
the reward earned."
Suppose a prize is offered to the winner of a race or to the
winner of a voting or guessing contest, under specified rules;
can the rules be changed or the offer be withdrawn by the offeror,
after substantial acts in reliance thereon by contestants? There
44 Zwolanek v. Baker Mfg. Co. (1912) 150 Wis. 517.
45 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Coyle (igo6) 123 Ky. 854; cf. Rehm-Zeiher
Co. v. Walker (1913) 156 Ky. 6.
46 See Blumenthal v. Goodall (1891) 89 Cal. 251. Where a definite time
was fixed for the making of the sale, the broker cannot earn his reward
by completing the service after the time. Zeiner v. Antisell (1888) 75
Cal. 50g. If the offer has been held open for a reasonable time, and the
broker has failed to render the service after a definite attempt, the offer
has been said to be revocable if the defendant is acting "in good faith."
See Sibbald v. Bethlehem Iron Co. (i88r) 83 N. Y. 378; Cadigan v.
Crabtree (9o4) 186 Mass. 7; Livery v. Miller (1883) 61 Md. 337. The
inference may be drawn from these cases that a revocation made unrea-
sonably or "in bad faith" would be ineffective.
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are cases tending to justify an inference, though not deciding,
that the offer has become irrevocable.
4 T
Where a reward has been offered for the return of a lost
article, it has been held that the finder has a lien on the article
to compel payment of the reward, without stopping to consider
whether or not the reward has been earned before delivery.
4 7a
It is apparent that the offer has become irrevocable before
delivery.
The rule that offers like the foregoing are revocable at any
time prior to complete performance of the acts requested has
encountered some criticism. 48  Sometimes a court is astute to find
that in fact there was no revocation.4 9  In many instances the
existence of a bilateral contract has been assumed without close
analysis of the facts, in order to render a revocation ineffective. 0
47 Mooney v. Daily News Co. (1911) 116 Minn. 212; Minton v. Smith
Piano Co. (1911) 36 App. Cas. (D. C.) 137, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 305.
47a Wood v. Pierson (1881) 45 Mich. 313; Wentworth v. Day (1841) 3
Met. (Mass.) 352; Wilson v. Guyton (1849) 8 Gill (Md) 213, semble;
see also Cummings v. Gann (1866) 52 Pa. St. 484.
48 Wald's Pollock, Contracts (3d ed.) p. 34, note ("the result is harsh");
Wharton, Contracts, sec. 13; W. W. Story, Contracts (5th ed.) sec. 495.
49 See Quick v. Wheeler (1879) 78 N. Y. 300.
50 There are numerous option contracts where the acceptance prescribed
would seem to be payment or some other onerous performance, but the
court has held that a mere notice of acceptance is sufficient to create a
bilateral contract. See Murphy Thompson v. Reid (19o7) 125 Ky. 585;
Rockland-R. Lime Co. v. Leary (IgII) 203 N. Y. 469; Barrett v. Mc-
Allister (1890) 33 W. Va. 738; article on Option Contracts by the writer
in 23 YALE LAW JOuRNAL, 641. See also the argument in Offord v. Davies
(1862) 12 C. B. (N. S.) 748. Sir Frederick Pollock, reviewing Ashley
on Contracts in 28 LAW QUART. REv. ioo, says: "If this be so (that there
is no acceptance until the act is completed), the promisor may withdraw
his offer when the work is all but done, or the promisee may capriciously
leave the work half done, and in either case without remedy, unless there
be something in the circumstances which can be made to support an
action of tort. A carter, for example, who is carrying goods to a wharf
to be put on an outgoing ship, may abandon them in the middle of the
journey. Both the plain man and the average lawyer will say that, what-
ever Prof. Ashley's logic may be, the law really cannot be so absurd as
that; and they will be right, and, what is more, any rational court before
whom such a question is moved will surely find a way to make them so.
It might easily be held that acting on a request for an act to be done
for reward implies a promise to go through with the performance. At
all events it seems to us that the offer is irrevocably accepted by the first
unequivocal commencement of the act requested. In fact it does not
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OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE
It is often maintained that the offer is irrevocable after the
offeree has done an act that binds him to complete the requested
performance.5 1
It has been suggested that in cases of the above sort, even in
the absence of an express promise not to revoke an offer, a
promise not to revoke is implied, the consideration therefor
being any substantial act whereby the requested performance is
begun.5 2  If such an option contract is justly inferable in fact, it
is governed by the same rules as an express contract to keep an
offer open. This has been discussed above. In many instances,
however, the inference of such a promise would be contrary to
fact. In those cases the promise would be a fiction and the
agreement that the beginning of performance should be the
consideration for this promise would likewise be a fiction. The
purpose of such a fiction is to make the offer irrevocable and it
is based upon a belief as to policy and general advantage. If
this is true and if in our process of evolution we have become
conscious of the fact, we are ready to discard the fiction and to
express in appropriate words the rule and its reason. It might
be expressed somewhat like this: Where an offer has been made
so that it can be accepted only by performing a series of acts
requiring an appreciable length of time and effort or expense,
such offer shall be irrevocable after the offeree has begun the
performance of the requested acts, unless the offeror expressly
reserved the power of revocation."
often happen that a man sets about a job without writing or uttering
some kind of word of acceptance. 'All right' is enough. Thus the
practical outcome of Prof. Ashley's ingenious exercise may be to convince
us that there are fewer unilateral contracts in the world than we supposed."
See also Bronnenberg v. Coburn (I886) iO Ind. 169, and cases in note 14,
supra.
"'Morrow v. So. Express Co. (1897) ioi Ga. 81o; Plumb v. Campbell
(1888) 129 Ill. 1oi; I Parsons, Contracts (5th ed.) p. 451. In Lascelles
v. Clark (191o) 204 Mass. 362, the defendant offered a guaranty "in
consideration of your continuing for the next month the account current
between you . . . . and 1)." The plaintiff at once made an agreement
with D for credit during the month. It was held that this completed the
contract of guaranty. Assuming that if acceptance were to consist of
acts covering the whole month the offer would be revocable on the 29th
day, the court says: "It cannot be supposed that the parties meant that."
Gelpcke v. Quentell (1878) 74 N. Y. 599.
5 2 McGovney, Irrevocable Offers, 27 HARv. L. Rav. 654.
53 There is a similar provision in the German Civil Code, sec. 658.
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To this rule there should probably be added some such rule
as the following: If the continuation of performanec will
increase the amount of the offeree's claim, the revocation shall
be effective; in such case if the offeree can show with reasonable
certainty that he would have performed in full, he shall be
entitled to the same damages as if the contract had been a
bilateral contract in the beginning.
54
Possible Unfairness. In this class of cases the question is of
some complexity, and it cannot be said that the above rules repre-
sent the settled law of any jurisdiction. There is enough reason
and authority in their favor, however, to warrant their careful
consideration in new legislation, parliamentary or judicial. A
possible argument against such rules is that they would operate
unfairly and unequally as between offeror and offeree. The
offeree will remain free to discontinue performance without any
claim for damages arising against him, while the offeror will
bear an irrevocable liability. The offeree remains legally privi-
leged and empowered to prevent a contract; the offeror's privi-
lege is wholly gone and in some cases his power of revocation
is gone also. It has been our custom to say that both parties
must be bound or neither is bound, but this properly applies
only to transactions by which it is intended to creat bilateral
duties. A closer consideration will show that there is no real
unfairness on this score. The offeror is the one who invites
action by the offeree, and he invites it in such a way that the
offeree bears all the risk of loss. The offeror will have to pay
nothing if the acceptance is not fully completed, and if it is
so completed he has received the requested equivalent for his
promise. The offeror has asked for no rights against the offeree
and has invested nothing in the hope of such rights and has
been induced to do expensive acts in reliance upon such expec-
tation. The offeree may find eventually, after much labor and
54 A provision in some respects like this is contained in the Swiss Code
of Obligations, sec. 8.
55 It is true that the acceptor's performance may confer rights in ren
upon the offeror and he may have made investments in the hope of such
rights. Also, as stated previously, the acts of the offeree may be the
prescribed mode of expressing a promise, in which case the offeror hopes
for a right in personam; this would be a rare case. It is not believed
that these exceptional cases (for which a separate rule might be desirable)
affect the validity of the argument above.
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OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE
expense, the complete acceptance by him is impossible or so
expensive as to exceed the offered compensation. Complete
acceptance may become impossible by reason of a third party's
previous acceptance of the offer. From this it appears that it is
fair enough for the one who bears the risk to possess the privilege,
while the other, bearing no risk, is deprived of both privilege
and power.58
Termination of Power by Offeree. The power created by an
offer may be terminated not only by the offeror but also by the
offeree, the possessor of the power. His mere failure to exer-
cise the power will not in itself cause such a termination, except as
such a failure fulfils a condition prescribed by the offeror or by
the law. If the offeror has expressly limited the life of the
power, he has thereby caused a failure to accept within the
prescribed period to be an operative fact. If the power to
accept is limited by the law to a "reasonable time," the law has
caused failure to accept to be an operative fact. However, in
such cases it would be more in accord with the instinct of the
average man to designate the act of the offeror as the cause
both of the birth of the power to accept and of its death.
It is usually said that the power of acceptance is terminated by
the act of the offeree in definitely rejecting the offer or in making
a conditional acceptance or counter offer. This is not necessarily
true. The offeror is the creator of the power and he may cause
it to live in spite of rejections and counter offers. If the offeror
should make an offer and at the same time notify the offeree
that the power to accept shall exist for two weeks and that a
rejection or counter offer shall not terminate it, it can hardly
be expected that a court would disregard the offeror's expressed
intention. The offeree may still reasonably believe the offer to be
open. The same result should follow, even in the absence of an
express notice, if the offeror has done any other overt acts
expressing such an intention. The real reason why a rejec-
tion or a counter offer should terminate the power to accept
"The reason for making an offer irrevocable given in deBecker's
Annotated Civil Code of Japan, art. 521, is: "the offeror cannot freely
withdraw his offer within the specified period of time, because the other
party may require to make some preparations for accepting it, and if
after he had made those preparations and was about to accept the offer,
the offeror suddenly withdrew the offer, it might cause a great deal of
prejudice and annoyance to the other party."
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prejudice and annoyance to the other party."
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seems to be the effect that they will probably have upon the
thought and actions of the offeror. If in the particular case they
have had no effects whatever-and the party asserting rights
under a contract must be able to show this-it should be held that
the power continues to exist. If, after a rejection or counter
offer, the offeror has done no overt act prior to the subsequent
act of acceptance, indicating with reasonable certainty that he
intends the power still to exist, no doubt it would be held that
such an acceptance has only the effect of a new offer; otherwise
the acceptor would be wholly at the offeror's mercy, for the latter
could prove the overt acts of acceptance, but the acceptor could
not prove that the offeror had continued to hold the offer open.
If the offeror has in fact done an overt act indicating his
intention to continue the existence of the power, there seems
to be no practical necessity for a notice of such act to be given
to the offeree, except that without such a notice he may never
accept. If without such a notice he does accept, he is still being
induced to act by the original notice. He is acting in accordance
with a power that he thinks he has, and that he has in fact. If
he can prove the facts as against the offeror, the latter should
be bound. The offeror will have no difficulty in proving the
facts as against the offeree, for he has evidence of the acceptance
and also of his own overt act continuing the power.
Revocation by Death or Insanity. The general rule is that the
power of acceptance is terminated by the death or by the super-
vening insanity of either the offeror or the offeree. This rule also
may be in harmony with the public interest; but there is not,
as is often supposed, any compelling necessity for its existence.
It may be said that you cannot contract with a dead man; but
neither can you force a dead man to pay his debts contracted
before his death. Yet the law has no difficulty, in the latter case,
in creating legal relations with the dead man's personal represen-
tative, and there would be no greater difficulty in declaring the
power of acceptance to survive as against the offeror's representa-
tive or in favor of the offeree's representative.51 It may again
be suggested that an offer is not a physical sensation or a state
of mind. Powers "coupled with an interest" survive the death
57 The German Civil Code, sec. 153, provides that the death of the offeror
shall not end the power, unless the contrary intention is apparent. See
Ashley, Contracts, sec. 17, note 2.
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OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE
of the grantor of the power. This rule might well apply to
offers where the acceptance is to consist of a series of acts
requiring time and labor or expense, and part performance has
taken place before notice of the death. It is on similar grounds
that option contracts have been enforced, although the acceptance
was subsequent to the death of one of the parties. "  It is gener-
ally held that the power created by a continuing guaranty is not
destroyed by the death of the guarantor without knowledge
thereof by the creditor.sa
ACCEPTANCE
An acceptance is a voluntary act of the offeree whereby he
exercises the power conferred upon him by the offer, and thereby
creates the set of legal relations called a contract.59  What acts
are sufficient to serve this purpose? We must look first to the
terms in which the offer was expressed, either by words or by
other conduct. The offeror is the creator of the power and at the
time of its creation he has full control over both the fact of its
existence and its terms. The offeror has, in the beginning, full
power to determine the acts that are to constitute acceptance.
After he has once created the power, he may lose his control
over it, and may become disabled to change or to revoke it; but
the fact that, in the beginning, the offeror has full control of the
immediately succeeding relation called a power, is the character-
istic that distinguishes contractual relations from non-contractual
58 See In re Adams & K. Vestry (1884) 27 Ch. D. 394; Ankeny v. Rich-
ardson (I911) 187 Fed. 550; Dibbins v. Dibbins (i896) 2 Ch. 348; Town-
ley v. Bedwell (i8o8) 14 Ves. 59i; Lawes v. Bennett (18o5) i Cox, 167;
Nicholson v. Smith (1882) 22 Ch. D. 640; Rockland-R. Lime Co. v. Leary
(xg) 203 N. Y. 469.
58a Bradbury v. Morgan (1862) I H. & C. 249; Coulthart v. Clemcntson
(1879) 5 Q. B. D. 42, semble; Harriss v. Fawcett (1873) L. R. 8 Ch. 866,
semble; In re Whelan [1897] I Ir. 575. Contra, Jordan v. Dobbins (0877)
122 Mass. 168. In Knotts v. Butler (1858) IO Rich. Eq. (S. C.) 143, it
was held that the guaranty was not terminated by death of the guarantor
with knowledge thereof by the creditor. The great weight of authority
is opposed to this.
19 Sometimes the closing of the contract requires not merely acts of
the acceptor, but also other operative facts-as where the offeror pre-
scribes that no contract shall exist until he receives the letter of acceptance.
With the mailing of the letter the acts of the offeree may come to an
end; but the receipt of that letter is another necessary operative fact. See
Lewis v. Browning (188i) 130 Mass. 173.
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ones. After the offeror has created the power, the legal conse-
quences thereof are out of his hands, and he may be brought into
numerous consequential relations of which he did not dream,
and to which he might not have consented. These later relations
are nevertheless called contractual.
Silence. There is one limitation upon this power of the offeror.
It has been held that he cannot confer a power of accepting by
mere silence.60 In one aspect, this seems to be a not unreasonable
limitation. The opposite rule, in such cases, would enable the
offeree to await the event, and to deny the fact of acceptance
if the contract now appears to be to his disadvantage, or to
assert the fact of acceptance if appearances are to the contrary.
This argument, however, proves too much; for it applies with
equal force to any positive act that might reasonably be per-
formed even though no offer has been made, and that has no
more probative force to establish assent than to establish some
other fact. Whether or not it would be so applied may be
regarded as doubtful."' A strong argument in favor of holding
the acceptance good is that the offeror has only himself to blame
if the terms of his offer put him at the mercy of the offeree, and
that he should not be permitted to escape liability when he has
induced the offeree to believe that there is a contract and to act
in reliance thereon. The weight of these opposing arguments
cannot be determined with certainty; but it will be a rare case
where the offeree has not done some overt act which indicates
his intention to accept, and in such case the courts would undoubt-
edly hold that the acceptance was good. This rule must not
be confused with the one to the effect that the offeror cannot
arbitrarily cause the silence or other ordinarily non-expressive
act of the offeree to operate as an acceptance against the will
of the offeree.6 - The offeror may, perhaps, confer the power on
the offeree to make such an act operate as an acceptance; but
he cannot unreasonably deprive the offeree of his preexisting
immunity in doing those acts or of his power to make them
operate otherwise. Thus, if the offeror declares that the offeree
shall accept by remaining silent or by eating his breakfast, the
offeree cannot be held against his will even though he seems to
o prescott v. Jones (1898) 69 N. H. 305; Felthouse v. Bindley (1862)
x C. B. (N. S.) 868; cf. also Kiihn, Ueber Vertragsschluss unter
Abwesenden, IHERING'S JAHRBUCHER, (N. Folge) 4, P. 5 f.
61 See White v. Corlies (1871) 26 N. Y. 467.
62 Royal Ins. Co. v. Beatty (1888) 11g Pa. St. 6.
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comply with the terms of the offer. In such a case, the conduct
of the offeree may with equal reason be regarded as an expres-
sion of quite different intentions and desires. In such case, it
might be left to the jury to determine whether or not the act was
done with the intention to accepte3 ; but it would be better to
instruct the jury that there is a contract only if the conduct of
the offeree has reasonably led the offeror to believe there has been
an acceptance.64
Impossible Acts. Since the offeror is privileged to make no
offer at all, or a power limited as he desires, he may prescribe acts
that are wholly impossible or are very difficult. If the prescribed
acts are totally impossible, there is in fact no power at all. So,
if A apparently offers to contract with B, but prescribes that
B must accept yesterday or must accept by going to the moon,
no contract can be made. It seems rather fanciful to say that B
has a legal power to accept but has not the physical capacity to
exercise it. If the prescribed mode of acceptance was that B
should lift a I,ooo lb. weight, it would not seem so fanciful.
B may not at present have the physical capacity to lift the weight,
but others have such capacity and B himself may acquire it. The
act of going to the moon is also not wholly inconceivable, but
the only individual capable of such a Cyclopean undertaking is
Noman. The act of accepting yesterday requires the turning
back of time and the living of history over again. This seems
wholly inconceivable, although Mark Twain's Connecticut Yankee
apparently accomplished the feat.
If a particular mode of acceptance has been prescribed by the
offeror, the offeree can bring about contractual relations only by
acting exactly in the mode prescribed. Nothing else will be
"equally as good. 65  It makes no difference how difficult or
expensive the prescribed acts may be, except so far as the
difficulty or expense may be evidence to indicate that the acts
were not in fact prescribed.
68 Brian, C.J., once said: "It is trite law that the thought of man is not
triable, for even the devil does not know what the thought of man is."
Very likely he was mistaken in each of the two statements. See Ashley,
Contracts, pp. 51, 52.
64 Thus, silence, in addition to a retention of possession of goods, has
been held to be an acceptance. Wheeler v. Klaholt (igoi) 178 Mass. 141.
The case may well be criticised on the ground that the offeror had pre-
scribed a particular mode of acceptance, while the offeree had not used
that mode and the offeror had no reason to suppose that he had.
65 Eliason v. Henshaw (1819) 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 225.
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Of course society is quite capable of creating powers in B
whereby he can create other legal relations with A, even though
B wholly disregards the expressed will of A; but in such case
we do not call those new legal relations contractual. It is here
that we reach the boundary line between contract and non-
contract.
No Prescribed Acts. Instead of being expressly limited, the
offer may prescribe no mode of acceptance whatever. There must
be enough to indicate that the offeror intends to create a power
of acceptance, but this is quite possible in the absence of any
suggestion whatever as to the mode of acceptance. In this case
the offeree may accept in any manner that the law deems to be
reasonable under the circumstances.
An even larger power of acceptance may be created by the
offeror. He may suggest and authorize an acceptance in one or
more particular modes, without making them exclusive. In such
case, compliance with the suggested mode will close the contract,
however unreasonable or unusual the mode may be; but so also
will compliance with any other mode that the law deems to be
reasonable. In this case, the offeree has all the power that he
would have if the mode of acceptance had been exactly pre-
scribed; and in addition thereto, all the power that he would
have if no mode of acceptance had been mentioned at all.
The foregoing rules of acceptance are applicable to all kinds
of contracts alike, unilateral and bilateral; but in their applica-
tion certain distinctions are to be observed and some difficulties
must be overcome. It is not always easy to determine what
mode of acceptance the offeror has required or suggested; a
reasonable construction must be put upon his words or other
conduct. If the offeror has prescribed no mode of acceptance
and if the offeree has not adopted some mode suggested by the
offeror, it must be determined whether or not the mode actually
adopted is to be deemed reasonable.
Notice. There is some conflict on the question of notice of
acceptance. Is the starting of such a notice by the offeree, 8 or
the receipt of such a notice by the offeror, one of the necessary
operative facts? This question is to be answered by an applica-
tion of the foregoing principles. The offeror may prescribe
either or both as a part of the mode of acceptance. If he does
66 This means the doing of an act that will, in the ordinary course of
events, make the offeror aware of the acceptance.
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so, the prescribed fact is a sine qua non, whether the proposed
contract is unilateral or bilateral. 7  If, however, the offeror
prescribes some particular mode of acceptance, not including a
notice, none should be required. This is very generally the case
where the offeror requests a return performance but no return
promise; and it is generally not the case where he requests a
return promise. If A offers his promise of a reward in return
for the capture of a felon, or for the destruction of a noxious
animal, or for the act of procuring some one to buy certain land, 8
or for the winning of a race,s° or for the buying and using of a
smoke ball and catching the influenza,70 the acts requested are
clearly indicated, and the contract is complete without any act
like mailing a notice, and without actual knowledge by the
offeror. If A offers his promise of guaranty in return for B's
act of advancing money to C, the contract is complete when B
has advanced the money.71 Where, however, A offers either
a promise or a performance in return for a promise to be made
by B, A does not usually specify any mode of acceptance. In
such case, what is the reasonable mode required by the laws? It
is a matter of course that B must do some overt act that expresses
his intention to accept, but this, in itself, is not enough. The
act must be one that B is justified in believing will bring notice
to A. In this case, such is the reasonable mode required by the
law, because A has asked for a promise-for an assurance upon
which he can rely. He cannot rely upon it without knowledge,
and it is therefore the custom of reasonable men to do acts that
may be expected to give notice to the offeror. It has been
vigorously asserted that the contract is not completed until receipt
of this notice by the offeror,72 but the authority against such a
07 Lewis v. Browning (i88i) 13o Mass. 173.
68 Harson v. Pike (i86i) 16 Ind. 140.
09 Alvord v. Smith (1878) 63 Ind. 58.
70 Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. [1893] 1 Q. B. 256.
7 lBishop v. Eaton (1894) 161 Mass. 496; Somersall v. Barneby (1611)
Cro. Jac. 287. The sending of a notice by mail may, by construction of
law, be made a condition precedent to a right of action on the guaranty;
but this does not make the notice a part of the process of acceptance.
The courts are in confusion on this. See Ames, Cases on Suretyship, p.
225 ff.
72 Langdell, Summary of Cont., sec. 14; Bramwell, L. J. dissenting in
Household, etc. Ins. Co. v. Grant (1879) 4 Ex. D. 216; McCulloch v. Eagle
Ins. Co. (1822) i Pick (Mass.) 278; Wald's Pollock, Contracts (3d. ed.)
P. 37.
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doctrine is now overwhelming, both in England and American.73
This fact shows that the criticisms of the prevailing rule are
based upon some a priori theory of contract that is not in harmony
with human desires and the other facts of life.
What acts are those that may reasonably be regarded as suffi-
cient in the effort to bring knowledge of the acceptance to the
offeror? If the parties are negotiating in each others' presence,
the act must be one that will bring immediate knowledge. The
offeree could not accept by mailing a letter, because in the absence
of an extended time for acceptance, such a mode would be
unreasonable and unusual. In choosing his mode of acceptance,
the offeree must consider the time of delivery, the place of
delivery, the certainty of arrival, and the intelligiblity of the
expression. If, considering these things, the offeree chooses the
customary mode, it is sufficient. It may be sufficient to mail a
letter, even though the offer was made orally, if several days
were allowed for acceptance.74 The starting of a telegram by
the usual telegraph companies would be equally -effective, and in
some instances would be effective where the mailing of a letter
would not be. If the offer itself was made by mail, it has been
supposed that this made the post office an agent of the offeror
to receive the letter of acceptance. This theory has been disap-
proved and seems to have little to support it. It is better to base
the rule upon the "usage of trade, '75 or "the ordinary usages of
mankind." 76
So much has been said about the necessity and propriety of
mailing a letter of acceptance that it is often taken to be univer-
sally required, even where the offeror has himself prescribed
another mode of acceptance.7 7
MUTUAL ASSENT
The rule generally laid down is that the acts of offer and
acceptance must be expressions of assent. This has long been the
73 See cases cited in Wald's Pollock, Contracts (3d ed.) p. 39, note 42.
See also Jap. Civil Code, art. 526.
74 Hent horn v. Fraser [1892] 2 Ch. 27.
75 Dunlop v. Higgins (1848) I H. L. Cas. 381.
71 Henthorn v. Fraser, supra; see also German Civil Code, sec. 151.
77Household etc. Ins. Co. v. Grant (1879) 4 Ex. D. 216; It re London
and Northern Bank [igoo] i Ch. 220. But Mr. Justice Holmes said in
Lennox v. Murphy (1898) 17, Mass. 370: "There is no universal doctrine
of the common law . . . . that acceptance of an offer must be com-
municated."
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another mode of acceptance.77
MUTUAL ASSENT
The rule generally laid down is that the acts of offer a
acceptance must be expressions of assent. This has long been the
73 See cases cited in Wald's Pollock, COlltracts (3d ed.) p. 39. t .
See also Jap. Civil Code, art. 526.
74 Henthom v. Fraser [18921 2 Ch. 27.
75 Dunlop v. Higgins (1848) I H. L. Cas. 381.
76 Henthorn v. Fraser, supra; see also German Civil Code, sec. 151.
71 H otlsehold etc. ltzs. Co. v. Grant (1879) 4 Ex. D. 216; lIZ re London
al/d Northem Balik [1900] I Ch. 220. But r. Justice ol es said in
Lelmo% v. Murphy (18gB) 171 Mass. 370: "There is no universal doctrine
of the common law . . . . that acceptance of an offer ust be co -
municated."
OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE
theory upon which contractual obligations have been enforced.
the test question usually put is, what was the intention of the
parties? It must not be supposed from this, however, that no
contractual relation can exist unless the parties both foresaw and
intended it. If two parties have gone through the form of
offering and accepting, the law determines the legal relations that
follow. Frequently these come with surprise and shock to the
parties themselves. It may be said here, as in the law of torts,
that the parties are presumed to intend the consequences of their
acts, but this is often a violent presumption contrary to fact. To
indulge such a presumption is merely to hold that the actual
intention of the parties is not the determinative fact, or even
that it is wholly immaterial.
Parties are bound by the reasonable meaning of what they
said and not by what they thought. If A makes an offer to B
which B reasonably understands to have a particular meaning,
and so accepts, A is bound in accordance with B's understand-
ing.71 So also, if A's offer has only one reasonable meaning, B
is bound in accordance therewith, even though he accepted sup-
posing the meaning to be otherwise. The operative act creating
an obligation is the expression of intention and not the thought
process.7 9  It may be said that the purpose of the rule is to
carry out the intentions of the parties in the great majority of
cases ;80 but it seems better to say that its purpose is to secure the
fulfilment of the promisee's reasonable expectations as induced
by the promisor's act."' In the law of contract as in the law of
tort, men are expected to live up to the standard of the reasonably
prudent man.8 2  If there is a misunderstanding and neither party
78 Mansfield v. Hodgdon (i888) i47 Mass. 304.
79 See Holland, Jurisprudence (ioth ed.) p. 253; cf. Anson, Contracts
(2d Am. ed., Huffcut) p. IO. "As to the rule that the wills of the con-
tracting parties must concur, it only means that they must concur in
legal contemplation." Langdell, Summary of the Law of Contracts, sec.
I8o; see also secs. 148, 149.
80 See Anson, cited in preceding note.
81 Holland, Juris. (ioth ed.) p. 253.
8 2 Where an acceptance was so worded that the offeror thought it con-
ditional, there was no contract even though the acceptor intended no
condition. "If it be true that respondent did not mean to convey such
an idea, but used language leading Mr. Hawley, in the exercise of ordi-
nary care, to suppose it did, it must bear the burden of its fault. He
had a right to act upon the meaning which the respondent's words con-
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process.79 It ay be said that the purpose f t r l i t
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cases ;80 but it see s better t sa t t its r s i t
fulfil ent of the pro isee's reasonable e ectati s s i
by the pro isor's act.81 . I t e la f tr t s i t l
tort, en are expected to live up to the standard f t e reas a l
prudent an.82 If there is a isunderstanding and neither art
78 M allsfield 'lI. Hodgdon (1888) 147 ass: 304-
79 See Holland, Jurisprudence (10th ed.) . ; f. , Oll ts
(2d Am. ed., Huffcut) p. 10. " s to the rule that the ills f t e c -
tracting parties ust concur, it only eans that they ust c c r ill
legal cOlltemplatiol~." Langdell, Su ary of the La f ontracts, sec.
180; see also sees. 148, 149.
80 See Anson, cited in preceding note.
81 Holland, Juris. (10th ed.) P.253.
82 Where an acceptance was so worded that the offeror thought it con-
ditional, there was no contract even though the acceptor intended
condition. "If it be true that respondent i t ea t e h
an idea, but used language leading r. a ley, in t e e ercise f r i-
nary care, to suppose it did, it ust bear the r e f its f lt.
had a right to act upon the eaning hich the respondent's r s c -
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was negligent, there is no contract8s 3  The same is true if both
are equally negligent. 4
The legal relations consequent upon offer and acceptance are
not wholly dependent, even upon the reasonable meaning of the
words and acts of the parties. The law determines these relations
in the light of subsequent circumstances, these often being totally
unforeseen by the parties. In such cases it is sometimes said that
the law will create that relation which the parties would have
intended had they foreseen.": The fact is, however, that the
decision will depend upon the notions of the court as to policy,
welfare, justice, right and wrong, such notions often being in-
articulate and subconscious."6
ARTHUR L. CORBIN.
YALE UNIVERSrrY, SCHOOL OF LAW.
veyed to him, if such, reasonably, might be the meaning an ordinarily
careful person would read out of such language." Jacob Johnson Fish
Co. v. Hawley (1912) 150 Wis. 578.83 Raffles v. Wichelhaus (1864) 2 H. & C. 9o6.
8 Falck v. Williams [i9oo] A. C. 176; Peerless Glass Co. v. Pacific Co.
(1898) 121 Cal. 641; cf. German Civil Code, secs. 119, 122.
85 "Supposing a contract to have been duly formed, what is its result?
An obligation has been created between the contracting parties, by which
rights are conferred upon the one and duties are imposed upon the other,
partly stipulated for in the agreement, but partly also implied by law,
which, as Bentham observes (Works III, 19o) 'has thus in every country
supplied the shortsightedness of individuals, by doing for them what they
would have done for themselves, if their imagination had anticipated
the march of nature."' Holland, Juris. (ioth ed.) p. 278. In Leonard
v. Dyer (1857) 26 Conn. 172, 178, the court said: "And if we were to add
stipulations to the contract which the parties themselves did not make,
it appears to us that such only should be inferred as the parties themselves
would have made, had they foreseen the circumstances that rendered such
stipulations important." See also Bankes, L. J., in Grove v. Webb (1916)
114 L. T. 1O82, 1O89.
88 "You can always imply a condition in a contract. But why do you
imply it? It is because of some belief as to the practice of the com-
munity or of a class, or because of some opinion as to policy, or, in short,
because of some attitude of yours upon a matter not capable of exact
quantitative measurement, and therefore not capable of founding exact
logical conclusions." Justice Holmes, The Path of the Law, IO HARV. L.
Rxv. 466.
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